open end

open end的基本解释

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开口端, 开端, 可扩展

与open end相关的网络例句 [注：此内容来源于网络，仅供参考]

Since the first open-end fund issue, there are 5th redemption, which also reveals more profound form of market phenomena causing open-end fund liquidity risk. In 2002, the open-end fund market was just established, in order to expand the size, many funds only attract institutional investors, and do not distinguish between investor by their liquidity preference. Under such single structure, institutional investors large size redemption will cause fund scale reduced significantly, which suffered huge losses. In 2003, as the Funds growth, more and more retail investors join in fund market and occupy a dominant position. Due to the lack of awareness of the fund market, they all use the concept of stock investment.

自开放式基金成立以来，中国历史上的5次赎回也更深刻的揭示了构成开放式基金流动性风险的市场现象。2002年为开放式基金成立初期，很多基金为了吸纳资本，扩大规模，只面向机构投资者融资，并且不区分投资者的流动性偏好，在这种单一的结构下，机构投资者的大额赎回就导致基金规模的锐减，从而遭受巨大损失。2003年，随着基金的发展，越来越多的散户介入其中并占据主导地位，由于缺乏对基金市场的认识，按照原有投资股票的理念投资基金，所以在低迷的股市稍有起色，基金稍有赢利时，就开始赎回，造成了多只基金净值的损失。2005年，保险行业可以直接入市，再加之逐渐回升的行情和基金公司高额的手续费，很多保险公司开始赎回持有的基金转而直接入市。

This paper analyses the homogenous tendency of open-end fund at first,pointing out that unperfect development of market and investors' immature investment opinions is the origin of such phenomena. Secondly,having compared the fund sizes and purchase fee rates of 25 open-end funds in China,conclude that there are problems of diseconomy of scale and indistinctive relativity between fees and achievement in Chinese open-end funds. Then this paper introduces benefit and cost function to analyze the problem of lack of motivation and constrain mechanism towards fund managers because of unreasonable fees in China. Thirdly,this paper analyze funds managers' normal hazards by static game model,and then points out fund managers have serious tunneling behaviors in Chinese open-end fund industry. In the end,this paper analyzes the causes of liquidity risk of open-end fun and the particularity of liquidity risk of open-end fund in China,and concludes that liquidity risk in Chinese open-end fund industry is higher through calculating the rates of share change and comparing the portfolio selections of top 20 open-end funds in China.

本文首先分析了我国目前存在的基金产品同质化现象，指出市场发展的不完善以及投资者投资理念的不成熟是同质化的根源所在；其次对比了我国现有的25只开放式基金的规模和申购费率，得出了我国开放式基金存在着规模效应不明显以及基金业绩与费率相关性不强的问题，并引入效益函数和成本函数分析了由于我国开放式基金费率不合理引发的基金管理者激励约束机制缺失的问题；再次，应用静态博弈模型分析了基金管理人面临的道德风险，指出目前我国开放式基金由于监管机制脆弱而存在着较为严重的管理者利益输送行为；最后，分析了开放式基金流动性风险的形成原因以及我国基金市场流动性风险的特殊性，并通过计算目前我国基金资产规模前20位的开放式基金的份额变动率以及比较它们的投资组合结构，得出了目前我国开放式基金流动性风险偏大的结论。

If we closed the stock fund and open the performance of equity funds to make a comparison, from the proceeds, we can not see a particular species has a distinct advantage, but the closed-end bond funds relative in open-end bond fund returns is a very obvious advantage, in fact, the last line of this table, the latest year, closed-end bond funds as opposed to open-end fund revenue increased 22.74 percent, nearly three years is 55.43 percent, nearly five years beyond the range of more than 55.9 percent, which the middle of the main reason for this is not the manager of closed-end funds than open-end fund managers with high levels, the key lies in product differentiation, one is closed, one is open.

如果我们关闭了股票基金和开放式股票基金的表现作比较，从收益中，我们看不到某一物种具有明显的优势，但封闭式债券基金相对开放年末债券基金的回报是非常明显的优势，事实上，这个表的最后一行，最近一年，封闭式债券基金相对于开放式基金收入增长百分之22.74，是近三年百分之55.43，接近五年超出了超过百分之55.9，其中的主要原因中间是不是经理封闭比开放式水平高的封闭式基金的基金经理，关键在于产品差异范围，一个是封闭的，一个是开放的。

与open end相关的网络解释 [注：此内容来源于网络，仅供参考]

open-end investment trust：开放股份投资信托

open-end lease开放型租赁 | open-end investment trust开放股份投资信托 | open-end management company开放股份管理公司

open-end mortgage：开放型抵押,未规定限额抵押

open-end management company开放股份管理公司 | open-end mortgage开放型抵押,未规定限额抵押 | open-end mutual fund开发股份共同基金

open-end mortgage：开放抵押

open-end method (采矿)敞开进路式矿柱回采法 | open-end mortgage 开放抵押 | open-end mutual fund 开放型共同基金