查询词典 shareholders' equity

Secondly,it discusses and enumerates the facts about pros and cons,alienation of the MRP.lt affirms that most advantage of MRP,as the rules of a unified company"s will reflects the equal status of shareholders and "Limited democracy".Meamwhile,it points out that the principle also provides the possibility for shareholders to change their own will into company"s will by voting "legally,fairly and sensibly",and to oppress,squeeze,swindle or to treat medium and small shareholders inequitably,or to abuse control power,in order to satisfy their own private interests.Thus,"the protection of the rights and interests of medium and small shareholders"realizes the high-level equality between big shareholders and medium and small shareholders,between majority stockholders and minoritystockholders ,with a view to redressing unbalanced interests relationship among shareholders.

其次对资本多数决的利弊及异化表现进行了论述和列举，在肯定资本多数决作为一项统一公司意思的议事规则，体现了股东地位的形式平等和&有限民主&思想的同时，指出该原则也为大股东&合法、合情、合理&地行使表决权将自己的意愿转换成公司的意志，压迫、排挤、欺诈或不公正地歧视中小股东，滥用控制权，满足一己私利提供了制度上的可能和空间，由此而产生中小股东权益保护问题，以矫正失衡的股东利益关系，实现大股东与中小股东、多数股东与少数股东之间更高层次的平等。

The conclusion of this paper shows that serious agency conflicts caused by sole state shareholders and equity dissevering between large shareholders who own non-tradable stock and small shareholders who own tradable stock, which is also based on agency conflicts in between them in circulation market , which finally result large shareholders' expropriation more serious.

本文研究表明，国有股&一股独大&与股权割裂使得持有非流通股的大股东与持有流通股的小股东之间产生了严重代理冲突，这种冲突是叠加在全流通市场上大股东与中小股东的代理冲突之上，从而导致我国证券市场上大股东侵害程度更为严重。

This paper chooses residual income model to measure the cost of equity capital, and construct some index to represent the total disclosure quality and earnings disclosure quality of Chinese listed companies. Our analysis shows that for the whole sample of listed companies which conduct seasoned equity offerings in the stock market, controlling 6, company scale, B/M, leverage and asset turnover, there is positive relationship between the total disclosure quality and marginal cost equity capital; there is negative relationship between the earnings radical and marginal cost equity capita; there is no remarkable relationship between the earnings smoothness and marginal cost equity capital.

本文采用剩余收益模型计算公司的股权融资成本，分别以披露总体质量和盈余披露质量作为反映我国上市公司信息披露质量的指标，研究发现在控制β系数、公司规模、账面价值比、盈利水平等因素的条件下，总体来看，信息披露总体质量越高的样本公司的边际股权融资成本越高；盈余激进度与边际股权融资成本负相关；而盈余平滑度与边际股权融资成本的关系并不显著。

Because our country executes is tax will be separated model, thus determine the tax on taxable profit in the confirmation and accounting, between many differences, must have permanent differences also has difference, the timing of the long-term equity investment difference compared to the equity method to control, because when the accounting of a long-term equity investment measured by employing the equity method under the condition of a long-term equity investment obtained from the disposal to every link existing accounting and tax laws are not consistent.

由于我国实行的是税会分离模式，因此税法上在确定应纳税所得额和会计在确认利润的时候，二者之间必然有很多的差异，既有永久性的差异也有时间性的差异，长期股权投资权益法导致的差异比较难以把握，因为当会计对长期股权投资采用权益法核算的情况下从取得长期股权投资到最后的处置每一个环节都存在会计处理和税法规定不相一致的地方。

Because a few shareholders are not always occupying the status of controlling in the company like most shareholders, so its interests are always open to the power of controlling shareholders, not probably controlled the shareholders according to ones own decision made of economic benefits and other at any time bona fide transaction is encroached on.

由于少数股东不像多数股东那样总是在公司中占据着控制支配地位，所以其利益总是暴露在控制股东的强权之下，随时有可能受到控制股东根据自身的经济利益所作出的决策以及其它不正当交易的侵害。

Shareholders are short of a restriction-and-balance mechanism. For state-owned enterprises, the final managers of the assets are holding the absolute majority of shares and indifferent to asset efficiency. For civil enterprises, the enterprise under control may just be a chessman on board, which means its strategy can be scarified for exchange for holding companies'interests. Different information advantages cause different supervision costs. Large costs can cause the shareholders to waive the supervision rights, which may be acquired by other stakeholders like managers, so even dispersive shareholder structure may go through strategic failure. The healthiness of external supervision regulation can influent the strategic participation of shareholders, since it directly influents the interest expectation of shareholders.

对国有企业来讲，大部分存在一股独大的特征，而国有资产最后管理者缺乏对资产效益的内在关心，这是导致管理者缺位的关键；对民营企业来讲，被控股企业可能是其投资安排的一个棋子，如果牺牲部分利益可以换得更多利益，或者能够将股份公司的利益直接转移到控股公司，企业的战略失败就很难避免；股东们的信息优势不同，造成监督代价不同，如果监督的代价过大就会导致股东放弃监督，而股东放弃的监督权必然被其他利益相关者，如经理人获得并被利用，因此分散的股东群体也可能出现战略失败；外部监督法规的健全与否对股东的战略参与行为有重大影响，因为它直接影响了股东的利益预期。

Article 19 Where the shareholders of a limited liability company or the directors and controlling shareholders of a joint stock company or the actual controllers of a company maliciously dispose of company properties and thus cause losses to any creditors after the company dissolution, or fail to make liquidation and cheat the company registration organ to deregister the legal person by means of a false liquidation report, if any creditors claim that the aforesaid shareholders, directors and controlling shareholders or actual controllers shall assume the corresponding civil liability for the debts of the company, the people' s court shall support the claim.

第十九条有限责任公司的股东、股份有限公司的董事和控股股东，以及公司的实际控制人在公司解散后，恶意处置公司财产给债权人造成损失，或者未经依法清算，以虚假的清算报告骗取公司登记机关办理法人注销登记，债权人主张其对公司债务承担相应赔偿责任的，人民法院应依法予以支持。

In fact, large shareholders influence even control corporation governance in many ways: concentration of shares endows large shareholder right of decision-making, so small shareholders can only advise, monitor and meaninglessly vote; therefore, probably, all shareholders pay for large shareholders individual profits if large wants, and pursuing the private benefit of control has externality.

从本文的分析来看，大股东对公司治理的影响比较复杂：持股相对集中有利于大股东克服外部性的障碍，为其他外部股东提供&监督&这样的公共产品；但同时，大股东追求私人收益的代价往往需要全体股东来共同支付，追求控制权私人收益的行为同样也有外部性。

Some shareholders may exercise its right of pre-emption.and its right of pre-emption rights can be transferred to other shareholders and to protect the limited liability company,For the transfer of ownership, without the consent of other shareholders, not actually funded or funded in full flight of investment after the transfer of ownership.lead to the transfer of shares of the company in violation of the quorum number of shareholders, the transfer of shares should not be any deemed to be invalid.

股东对其优先购买权可以部分行使，并可以将其优先购买权的权利转让给其他股东以维护有限责任公司的人和性，对于未经其他股东同意而转让股权、未实际出资、足额出资或抽逃出资后转让股权、股权转让导致公司股东人数违反公司法定人数的，不能一概认定为股权转让无效。

The controlling shareholders' agency problem is of great importance to corporate governance in china listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to study the controlling shareholders' agency problem from financing instruments and to analyze the relationship between the controlling shareholders' agency problem and equity financing preference.

中文摘要：控股股东的代理问题是中国上市公司治理的重大课题，本文的研究的题目是中国上市公司的股权融资中的代理问题，是从融资的方面对代理问题进行展开研究，分析了控股股东代理问题和股权融资偏好问题之间的联系，并提出改进的建议。

It's not quite as simple as that.

并没有那么容易。

It debuted in 1992 in Japan and the United Kingdom, and 1993 in the United States.

它首次亮相于1992年在日本和英国，在美国1993年。